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ABSTRACT 
The study of civil war has increased exponentially during the post-Cold War period. 
This has not, however, resulted in greater levels of consensus with regard to the causes 
and nature of this phenomenon. Indeed, as Jonathan Goodhand has shown, the conflict 
studies discipline is currently experiencing something of a ‘crisis of theory as well as a 
crisis of practice’ (2006, 29). This article aims to show, however, that this situation can 
be alleviated by drawing on the critical realist approach to the philosophy of science. 
This is the case, in short, because critical realism provides conflict studies authors with 
a more sophisticated and coherent understanding of causality than has previously been 
available to them. More specifically, it has developed a mechanism-based understanding 
of causality which transcends the persistent split between (1) nomothetically-oriented 
(or ‘universal law-oriented’) approaches, predominantly associated with the work of 
various neo-positivist authors, and (2) idiographically-oriented (or ‘single case-
oriented’) approaches, associated with the work of a much more diverse group of 
authors. By making the case for this mechanism-based approach, however, this article 
also aims to show that critical realist philosophy paves the way for an alternative 
approach to social science. An approach, that is, which – rather than consistently 
abstracting from (historical/geographical) context in the way that neo-positivist studies 
do – systematically engages with the context in which civil wars take place.   
 
‘Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas’  
(Happy is s/he who is able to know the causes of things)  
- Virgil 
 
Introduction 
 
The study of civil war has increased exponentially during the post-Cold War period. This 
has not, however, resulted in greater levels of consensus with regard to the causes and nature 
of this phenomenon. Rather, conflict studies authors have developed a variety of contrasting 
approaches which have consistently made competing and contradictory claims. Indeed, even 
authors who have adopted the same philosophical/methodological orientation and have 
drawn on the same sources of data have often come to very different conclusions. This has, 
as Jonathan Goodhand has shown, resulted in something of a ‘crisis of theory as well as a 
crisis of practice’ (ibid) within the conflict studies discipline. In order to alleviate this 
situation the current article will (1) engage with the philosophical/methodological roots of 
the conflict studies literature in significant depth, and (2) argue in favour of an alternative to 
two of the main philosophical/methodological approaches that have been adopted during the 
post-Cold War period. An alternative, that is, which is rooted in the critical realist approach 
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to the philosophy of science. This approach – here explicitly understood as both developing 
and internally-differentiated in nature – has its origins in the important (though 
controversial1) work of the British philosopher Roy Bhaskar (2008 [1975], 1998 [1979]), 
and has more recently been adopted and developed by a limited number of authors working 
within the disciplinary confines of International Relations as well (see especially Kurki, 
2008; Patomäki and Wight, 2000; Wight, 2006, 2007).  
The aim of this article, however, is to show that the critical realist approach has 
developed a more sophisticated and coherent understanding of causality than has previously 
been available to authors working within the field of conflict studies, a sub-discipline which 
– for better or for worse – has until now remained relatively free from the important 
philosophical/methodological discussions that have characterized the broader International 
Relations literature. More specifically, it aims to show that critical realism has developed a 
mechanism-based understanding of causality which transcends the persistent split between 
(1) nomothetically-oriented (or ‘universal law-oriented’) approaches to the study of civil 
war, predominantly associated with the work of various neo-positivist2 authors, and (2) 
idiographically-oriented (or ‘single case-oriented’) approaches to the study of civil war, 
associated with the work of a much more diverse group of authors. It deserves emphasis, 
however, that this article should not be read as suggesting that these two philosophical/ 
methodological approaches are in fact the only approaches which have been adopted during 
the post-Cold War period. This is, quite clearly, not the case. Rather, it proceeds on the basis 
of the claims that it is these two approaches which (1) have been most influential, (2) have 
provided the most clearly-identifiable positions for conflict studies authors and students to 
adopt, and (3) that they are therefore deserving of greater attention when attempting to 
devise an alternative which is rooted in the mechanism-based understanding of causality that 
is favoured by critical realists. Before making the case for this alternative, however, the first 
part of this article will begin by uncovering/reviewing the claims and assumptions which the 
two aforementioned approaches have made concerning both the nature and the range of 
causal explanation, thereby aiming to clarify the exact nature of the debate between them. 
While doing so, however, this part of the article will also situate nomothetically- and 
idiographically-oriented approaches within the broader philosophical/methodological 
traditions from which they have emerged. The second part of the article will then proceed by 
discussing the approach to causality which critical realist philosophy has developed. This 
approach, it will argue, allows us to both rethink and reclaim causal analysis in a way that 
transcends the nomothetic/idiographic divide within the conflict studies discipline.  
 
Conflict Studies and Causality: Two Divergent Approaches to the Study of 
Civil War 
 
Positivism and the Nomothetic Approach 
 
The nomothetic approach to the study of civil war is perhaps most closely associated with the 
kind of large-N/cross-national neo-positivist studies that have commonly been published by 
journals like the Journal of Conflict Resolution and the Journal of Peace Research. In 
journals such as these a wide variety of authors have sought to make the most of the rapid 
post-Cold War expansion of both data-sets and technical abilities by enquiring into the 
causes, nature, termination, etc. of civil war (for a useful overview of the development and 
current status of this literature see: Florea 2012; for a selection of especially influential neo-
positivist conflict studies ‘classics’ see: Collier 2000, 2003, 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 
2004; Collier and Rohner 2008; Collier et al 2004; Collier and Sambanis 2005; Fearon 2005; 
Fearon et al 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Sambanis 2004a, 
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2004b). Such efforts have rarely been explicitly described, at least by these authors 
themselves, as involving the adoption of a positivist approach. Their work can, however, be 
plausibly described as belonging to this tradition for a number of key reasons. Prominent 
among these is the fact that the studies they have produced have, without exception, been 
quantitative (econometric/statistical) in nature. In adopting this philosophical/methodological 
orientation they have therefore clearly echoed the emphasis on mathematical precision which 
is commonly associated with positivist endorsements of a ‘hard sciences’ approach.  
More important for the purposes of this article, however, is the understanding of 
causal explanation which has informed the work of these authors. This is the case because 
their work has clearly been influenced by the covering law approach.3 This approach, which 
will be described below, has two main historical sources. The first of these is Newtonian 
physics, particularly celestial mechanics. This branch of astronomy is concerned with the 
movements of celestial objects, and Newton is generally understood as having successfully 
uncovered the universal/deterministic laws of motion which underpin these movements 
(Manicas 2006, 18). Indeed, Newtonian physics is often considered so successful that it has 
become the archetypal example of the ‘hard sciences’. In addition to having roots in 
Newtonian physics, however, the covering law approach has roots in a second source as well. 
This is the sceptical form of empiricism that was developed by David Hume, who argued that 
– as causes themselves are not observable, and must therefore be considered ‘metaphysical’ – 
we cannot legitimately speak of, or claim knowledge about, natural necessity (Kurki 2008, 
37). Indeed, Hume claimed (1) that we should disavow metaphysics in its entirety by 
eschewing notions of causal connection and limiting ourselves to speaking of events that are 
regularly conjoined, and (2) that when we assume ‘that one object is connected with another, 
we mean only that they have acquired a connection in our thought’ (in Groff 2013, 13). 
Projecting such (internal) habits/customs onto the (external) world is, however, a mistake, as 
all that we are really entitled to say ‘is that the thought of soapy water is always followed by 
the thought of the rice starch on the dinner plates dissolving’ (Groff 2013, 14). Hume 
maintained, however, that these kinds of conjunctions of events are in fact sufficient, and that 
we may proceed to define a cause as ‘[a]n object precedent and contiguous to another, and 
where all objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and 
contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter’ (2009, 274-75). This has generally been 
interpreted to mean – whether accurately or not (Walters and Young 2001; Fleetwood 2005; 
Groff 2013, especially chapter two) – that we can only legitimately speak of correlations 
(conjunctions of events) and not of causality (natural necessity), and it has at times resulted in 
positivists limiting ‘real’ science to prediction rather than explanation (Kurki 2008, 47). 
More commonly, however, they have maintained (1) that science requires a symmetry 
between explanation and prediction, and (2) that the maturity of a scientific discipline can be 
measured by means of its ability to provide accurate predictions.  
At their most confident positivists have also favoured the idea that, in order to provide 
an explanation for an event, we must describe the universal/deterministic covering law which 
governs it. Such laws refer, in short, to parsimonious statements of the sort: ‘when empirical 
event (A), then empirical event (B)’. More elaborately, however, they refer to the idea that 
causal explanations must stipulate the exact conditions (A) for the occurrence of a particular 
event (B). Whenever (A) arises, therefore, the covering law approach maintains that event (B) 
must also take place. This is the case because event (B) can be deduced from its initial 
conditions (A), making the explanation of a particular outcome a matter of identifying the 
universal law of which it is an instance. If this strategy fails – that is, if event (B) does not 
follow from initial conditions (A) as predicted – a theory (and the law it purportedly 
describes) is understood to be falsified (i.e. disproved). If, instead, this strategy succeeds, a 
theory (and the law it accurately describes) is understood to be verified (proved). This 
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approach was self-consciously modelled on common understandings of Newtonian physics, 
and – along with the mathematizing and empiricist (anti-metaphysical) demands of ‘real’ 
science – aimed to secure the indubitable/unassailable foundations for knowledge-
development which Enlightenment/modernist thought had often sought in order to prevent a 
collapse into radical forms of scepticism and/or relativism.  
 
 
Neo-positivism and the Nomothetic Approach 
 
It should be noted, however, that these ‘hard science’ demands have often been significantly 
‘softened’ in practice by various forms of neo-positivism. Perhaps the most common way in 
which this has been done – in addition to relaxing the demands for mathematical 
exactness/precision – is by means of the claim that covering laws are in fact probabilistic (i.e. 
non-deterministic) in nature. Whenever (A) is found, therefore, it is claimed that it is 
probable that (B) will occur as well. This intellectual hedging strategy, while often 
continuing to employ the language of laws, has therefore more commonly been concerned 
with discovering ‘law-like’ regularities. This qualification has, however, been accompanied 
by a second qualification as well. A qualification, that is, which is directed at Hume’s claim 
that conjunctions of events are sufficient when describing a causal relationship. This is, quite 
clearly, not the case. As is common knowledge, it is often possible to get extremely reliable 
results on the basis of an entirely spurious correlation. As the rate of inflation ‘has correlated 
more strongly with the incidence of Scottish dysentery than the money supply’, for instance, 
‘the former would have proved a better predictor of inflation than the latter’ (Sayer 2010, 90). 
Such ‘explanations’ are of course entirely at odds with our intuitions about the way the world 
works, but follow from the manner in which Hume’s claim has most commonly been 
interpreted. Neo-positivists have therefore maintained that, although regularities are a 
necessary feature of causal relationships, they are not in fact sufficient.  
It is, importantly, this ‘softer’ (doubly-qualified) manifestation of the covering law 
approach which neo-positivist authors in the conflict studies discipline have adopted as well. 
As Paul Collier argues in his most recent book on civil war, for instance, his work is ‘not 
interested in the personalities and immediate political circumstances’ leading to a particular 
civil war (2010, 125). Such issues, he argues, ‘matter for a proper understanding of any 
particular war but clutter up and detract from our understanding of civil war as a 
phenomenon’ (ibid). His work therefore aims ‘to find [the] structural characteristics that 
expose a country to risks’ (ibid) instead, and – along with the work of other neo-positivist 
authors – has attempted to find robust correlations between a wide range of factors (ethnic 
fragmentation/polarisation/domination, resource abundance/scarcity, horizontal/vertical 
inequalities, low/high per capita or domestic income, regime type, state capacity, etc.) and the 
occurrence (initiation, duration, termination, prevalence, intensity, recurrence, outcome, etc.) 
of civil war. Indeed, while the work of these authors is often replete with talk of causal 
mechanisms in practice4, its implicit aim has been the development of a (probabilistic/quasi-
nomothetic/quasi-deductive/quasi-falsificationist and parsimonious) theory of civil war which 
applies irrespective of historical and geographical context.  
The same applies, importantly, to a number of well-known large-N/cross-national 
neo-positivist studies which have sought to overcome the seeming limitations of relying 
exclusively on quantitative data by incorporating qualitative evidence derived from case 
studies (Sambanis 2004a; Collier and Sambanis 2005). This is the case, as George Steinmetz 
has shown (in a different context), because these kinds of ‘mixed methods’ studies – while 
moving away from the exclusive reliance on quantitative data that is commonly associated 
with positivism – inevitably treat the data which they derive from such case studies as 
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‘‘‘idiographic’’ raw data waiting to be processed by ‘‘nomothetic’’ theory machines’ (2004, 
383). The assumptions which these kinds of studies have made about the nature of causal 
explanation, and how to verify/prove or falsify/disprove their theories, have therefore 
remained unchanged. In fact, these quasi-nomothetic philosophical assumptions have exerted 
such a powerful disciplining influence on large-N/cross-national neo-positivist studies of civil 
war that they have had a significant impact on their relationship to the study of history (and 
geography) as well. Specifically, these assumptions have resulted in neo-positivist studies 
conceiving of history as a ‘context-less data set or passive record through which abstract 
formulas, concepts and hypotheses can be assessed’ (Lawson 2010, 210). This has ensured 
that the conflict studies discipline currently reflects the much broader division of labour 
‘between theory-building political scientists and chronicling historians’ which continues to 
hold sway throughout much of academic life (ibid, 214). Indeed, in a way that exactly mirrors 
the incorporation of case studies into their large-N/cross-national models the work of neo-
positivist conflict studies authors has therefore reduced the role of history to the provision of 
idiographic raw data for their nomothetic theory machines as well.  
 As was highlighted at the start of this article, however, the adoption of this quasi-
nomothetic strategy has failed to produce a consensus with regard to the causes and nature of 
civil war. This has inspired a variety of reformist responses, two of which have 
predominated. The first of these has aimed, quite simply, to refine large-N neo-positivist 
studies by attempting to resolve the various data and technical problems which they have 
encountered. 5  In a well-known discussion of coding problems, for instance, Nicholas 
Sambanis has stated that such problems should not lead his readers to think that ‘coding wars 
and analyzing them quantitatively is a futile exercise. Rather than abandon[ing] these efforts’, 
he claims, we should redouble them ‘by improving the coding rules, applying them 
transparently to the data, and studying the implications of differences across coding rules’ 
(2004a, 857; also see: Florea, 2012). While the existence of various data and technical 
problems is acknowledged, therefore, the aim of developing quasi-nomothetic forms of 
theory remains firmly in place. A second reformist response, however, has instead sought to 
abandon the large-N nature of neo-positivist studies in favour of a more spatiotemporally-
restricted and disaggregated approach (Nathan 2008). This approach has, for instance, sought 
to combine the neo-positivist search for reliable statistical correlations with the use of various 
typologies which categorize civil wars in terms of their scale (Gleditsch et al, 2002), their 
origins and conduct (Kalyvas 2005, 2007), their geographical centre (Buhaug and Gates 
2002), whether they are ‘identity’ or ‘non-identity’ conflicts (Sambanis 2001), whether they 
are ‘territorial’ or ‘governmental’ conflicts (Buhaug 2006), etc. The assumption which this 
strategy depends on, of course, is that the reliable statistical generalizations and empirical 
regularities which have eluded large-N neo-positivist studies may finally reveal themselves 
once we adopt a more disaggregated/spatiotemporally-restricted approach. As for instance 
Halvard Buhaug has warned, 'an aggregated research design is likely to diminish or even 
conceal important causal relationships that apply only to conflicts of one kind' (ibid, 692).  
 
 
‘Generalization Anxiety’ and the Idiographic Approach 
 
Even after disaggregating the category of civil war in these kinds of ways, however, 
significant anxieties have persisted about the extent to which the results of any particular 
study are ever likely to be generalizable, or – indeed – whether any neo-positivist study is 
likely to produce reliable predictions (see for instance: Buhaug and Gates 2002, 421; 
Blattman and Miguel 2010, 37; Ward et al 2010). In fact, the seemingly ineliminable 
indeterminacy and complexity of civil wars has led some to develop an alternative to neo-
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positivism by rejecting, rather than reforming, it tenets. Adrien Ratsimbaharison (2011), for 
instance, has argued that – because of the various deficiencies which he associates with 
quantitative and deductive forms of research – the neo-positivist approach (adopted mostly by 
economists and political scientists) should be abandoned in favour of qualitative and 
inductive forms of research (adopted mostly by historians and anthropologists).6 A similar 
type of scepticism runs through the work of Christopher Cramer as well, who has argued that 
studies of civil war should always consider both ‘the diversity of its causes and motivations’ 
and ‘the diversity of its conduct and organisation’ (2006, 135). Indeed, he has suggested – in 
direct contradiction to what large-N/cross-national neo-positivist studies have always 
assumed to be the case – that ‘[p]erhaps there can be no theory of war’ at all (ibid).  
The appeal of such ‘soft(er)’ approaches – while posing serious questions about the 
scientific status and maturity of the conflict studies discipline – has been apparent in the fact 
that numerous authors have chosen (whether self-consciously or not) to pursue forms of 
idiographically-oriented research instead. These kinds of research, making use particularly of 
case studies, historical narratives, and interpretive/hermeneutic methods (Fuji 2010, 2011; 
Hamilton 2007; Kaufman 2001), have adopted a much more contextual approach than has 
been apparent within neo-positivist forms of research, and – importantly – they have often 
produced findings which directly contradict the findings of nomothetically-oriented studies 
(Call 2010; Vinci 2006). Indeed, while a significant amount of the contemporary proponents 
of these forms of research would undoubtedly wish to take issue with the historical roots of 
the idiographic approach, it deserves emphasis that the aforementioned kinds of investigation 
have commonly been grounded by means of philosophical traditions which differ strongly 
from the Enlightenment/modernist tradition that has underpinned (neo-)positivism. These 
traditions are, in fact, typically understood as explicit reactions against positivism, and are 
therefore commonly grouped together under umbrella terms such as ‘anti-positivism’. At a 
very general level it can be argued that these anti-positivist traditions have taken issue with 
the mechanistic/deterministic tendencies which (neo-)positivism is said to represent. Indeed, 
these otherwise extremely varied philosophical/methodological traditions have been united in 
terms of their opposition to the covering law approach. Of particular importance for 
grounding this opposition has been the common observation that, unlike the events which are 
studied by physics, human/social events do not seem to recur. That is to say, concrete events 
– like, say, the Angolan civil war – do not seem to recur in their geographically/historically 
specific form. Rather, human/social events appear to be non-repeatable/unique in a way that, 
for instance, the movements of celestial objects seem not to be (Steinmetz 2004).  
This observation has been theorized in a wide variety of different ways, but a number 
of approaches that are currently quite influential – and are commonly grouped together 
(imperfectly) as ‘post-structuralism’ and ‘the new materialisms’ – have argued in favour of 
what is essentially an inversion of the covering law approach. That is to say, these approaches 
have attempted to supplant the positivist ontology of deterministic, mechanistic, universal, 
and unchanging covering laws (‘being’) with an ontology that, instead, stresses 
indeterminacy, openness, particularity, and change (‘becoming’). As for instance Diana 
Coole has argued, her new materialist work ‘is not about Being, but becoming’ […] ’what is 
invoked is a process not a state’ (2013, 453).  Such an approach has, to numerous types of 
authors, appeared to make better sense of the non-repeating/unique nature of human/social 
events, and, in addition, has seemed to better account for the enormous variety which 
characterizes both historical trajectories and forms of social organization around the world.7 
This is, however, a perceived strength of idiographic approaches to research more generally, 
as its advocates have – though certainly to varying degrees8 – gravitated towards forms of 
enquiry which, instead of stressing the universal, the general and the law-like, stress the 
particular, the unique, the contingent, and the contextual.  
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As has happened everywhere else in the human/social sciences as well (Lawson 
2010), however, the adoption of this ‘soft’ orientation has also resulted in accusations by 
conflict studies authors, here summarized by Cramer, that idiographic studies ‘are overly 
descriptive, [that] they do not confirm any general theoretical constancy and [that] the more 
detailed [i.e. complex/non-parsimonious] they are the less useful they are for the rest of the 
world’ (2006, 92; also see Kalyvas 2006, 7-9). Indeed, more generally, the adoption of an 
idiographic orientation to research has often been accompanied by the claim that, as these 
forms of enquiry do not conform to the (inductive and/or deductive) generalizing aims which 
are commonly associated with science, they are not in fact scientific at all.  
It should be noted, however, that this is a conclusion that some proponents of anti-
positivist approaches have themselves actively embraced. Numerous advocates of 
interpretive/hermeneutic approaches, for instance, have argued against the ‘physics envy’ 
which, they claim, characterizes the human/social sciences. This means, concretely, that they 
have sought to oppose the naturalist idea that the methods which are commonly associated 
with the natural sciences – particularly its quantifying tendencies – are also suitable for 
enquiries into the human/social world. Rather than attempting to model the study of human 
beings on celestial mechanics, for instance, the proponents of interpretive/hermeneutic 
approaches have commonly argued that the human/social realm requires very distinctive (and 
commonly qualitative) methods for its study. These methods should uncover the meanings of 
or reasons for particular human actions, but – it is now often claimed9 – should refrain from 
engaging in the kind of causal (covering law) explanations which are typically associated 
with science. Indeed, rather than attempting to (causally) explain events in a (neo-)positivist 
manner, the proponents of these approaches have commonly argued that the human/social 
world must be (non-causally) understood. 10  Their adoption of this ‘soft’ anti-naturalist 
orientation towards making civil wars (and events more generally) intelligible has, of course, 
placed idiographic approaches firmly at odds with the quasi-nomothetic explanatory strategy 
which neo-positivist studies – such as the one by Collier (2010) that was alluded to above – 
have adopted. It should be noted, however, that this situation has commonly been exacerbated 
by the fact that anti-positivist authors have generally rejected the idea that science can in fact 
provide us with the indubitable/unassailable foundations for knowledge-development which 
proponents of Enlightenment/modernist thought had often aimed to secure. At best, this 
rejection of epistemic foundationalism has resulted in calls for greater modesty about our 
knowledge-claims. At its most pessimistic, however, the embrace of anti-foundationalism has 
resulted in the gradual drift towards radical forms of scepticism and relativism which 
positivists have always feared, and that – at least within the current intellectual climate – is 
most closely associated with the more defeatist strands of postmodernist theorizing.  
Whatever analytical benefits may be derived from adopting an idiographic approach 
towards our research into the causes and nature of civil war it should therefore be clear that, 
at least at times, these benefits can (and have) come at a very significant price as well. As the 
second part of this article will show, however, this is not a price which it is in fact worth 
paying. This is not the case, importantly, because a return to the (quasi-)nomotheticism and 
‘generalization anxiety’ of (neo-)positivism is warranted. Indeed, as the next section will 
show, the neo-positivist approach is untenable at both a philosophical and a practical level. 
Rather, this is the case because critical realism allows us to both rethink and reclaim causal 
analysis in a way that prevents us from having to pay the price that has often resulted from 
adopting an idiographic approach. Indeed, more generally, by adjusting our understanding of 
causality in the manner which critical realism has suggested, it becomes possible to transcend 
the nomothetic/idiographic divide in its entirety. It is to an elaboration and defence of this 
claim that this article will turn at present.  
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Beyond the Nomothetic/Idiographic Divide: A Critical Realist Approach 
to the Study of Civil War  
 
Philosophical Preliminaries and the ‘Epistemic Fallacy’ 
 
In order to provide this elaboration and defence, however, it is of key importance that we 
first situate critical realism – as an internally-differentiated and developing approach to the 
philosophy of science – by drawing attention to the positions which it has adopted 
concerning a number of key philosophical discussions. While the relevance of these 
discussions may not be immediately apparent to the readers of this article, and I am 
undoubtedly beginning to test the patience of even the most committed among them at this 
stage, I urge them to kindly bear with me. After all, when the path to (scientific) progress 
becomes muddied, and a disciplinary crisis such as the one that was alluded to at the start of 
this article arises, it is potentially far more fruitful for us to step back than it is to simply 
push on with those analytical strategies with which we are already familiar. Indeed, as will 
hopefully become clear throughout this section, the consequences understanding causality 
from a critical realist are far-reaching, and allow us to steer the study of civil war in a much 
more productive direction. It is therefore with the promise of a handsome reward after hard 
(philosophical) labour that this section will begin by drawing attention to the positions 
which critical realist philosophy of science has adopted concerning the aforementioned 
positivism/anti-positivism and foundationalism/anti-foundationalism debates. 
With regard to the first of these debates, it should be noted that critical realism has 
adopted a clear anti-positivist stance. Importantly, however, it has done so in order to better 
ground the notion of science, and not – like many other anti-positivist approaches – to 
discard it or restrict its range. Indeed, as the next few sections aim to show, it is exactly the 
fact that it has adopted an anti-positivist orientation which has allowed it to rethink/reclaim 
both causal analysis and, more broadly, the notion of science. In order to make sense of 
these claims it will, however, be necessary to draw attention to the position which it has 
adopted concerning the aforementioned foundationalism/anti-foundationalism debate as 
well. In this, as in most matters of concern, critical realism has developed an alternative to 
both extremes. While it denies that that there are indubitable/unassailable foundations from 
which absolutely secure knowledge can be developed, for instance, it has also denied that 
this means that we cannot develop robust forms of knowledge at all. Instead, it has 
developed a ‘post-foundationalist’ approach which relies largely on the immanent critique of 
rival positions in the philosophy of science. Indeed, with regard to the issue of causality 
Bhaskar has developed a type of immanent critique that he terms an Achilles’ heel critique. 
This type of critique seizes on ‘the most important premise for a particular position’ and 
aims to show that ‘all the beautiful insights that are hoped to be sustained by it cannot in fact 
be sustained’ (Bhaskar in Bhaskar and Hartwig 2010, 79; also see Bhaskar 1989, 15, 155). 
This strategy is applied, throughout A Realist Theory of Science (2008 [1975]), to what is the 
archetypal activity of the ‘hard sciences’ – experimental activity – in order to show that the 
area in which positivism has long presumed it is strong, it is in fact weak. Bhaskar claims, 
for instance, that engaging in experimentation is both incompatible with and unintelligible 
from a positivist perspective. Concerning the more specific issue of causality, however, he 
claims that the apparent need to engage in experimentation illustrates that both the ‘non-
causal’ approach which numerous idiographic approaches have adopted and the covering 
law approach which positivists have favoured are unsustainable/incoherent. Indeed, he 
claims, against even the more modest (probabilistic) manifestations of positivism, that the 
consistent need for scientists to engage in experimentation illustrates that regularities are 
neither a sufficient nor a necessary feature of causal processes.  
9 
 
In order to make sense of this claim it is essential that we proceed by posing a very 
basic question: why are the kinds of practical interventions into the natural world that are 
characteristic of experimentation required at all? The sceptical form of Humean empiricism 
which has helped to ground positivism demands, after all, that knowledge is derived solely 
by means of sensory experience. Such an approach is therefore incompatible with situations 
in which forms of experimental intervention are required in order to develop knowledge. If 
engaging in experimentation is in fact the necessary feature of science that it appears to be, 
however, it follows from this that the nature of the world is not in fact always accessible to 
us by means of our sensory organs. Indeed, as Andrew Collier has argued, the ‘nature of the 
work we must do in order to find out about the world’ illustrates ‘that the world is not 
transparent to us but [that it] needs to be discovered’ (1994, 22). If we could simply ‘taste 
the hydrogen and oxygen in water’, after all, ‘we would not need to separate them by 
electrolysis. Knowledge which we in fact have only by virtue of scientific experiment (water 
= H2O) could then have been acquired in the same way as we discover [that] the grass is 
green and lemons are sour’ (ibid, 31). The consistent need to engage in experimentation in 
order to find out what the world is like, however, illustrates that the most emblematic 
practice of the ‘hard sciences’ is not just unintelligible from a positivist perspective but – 
importantly – that it also aims to develop forms of knowledge which (1) go beyond sensory 
experience (trans-phenomenality), and (2) contradict sensory experience (counter-
phenomenality).11 It is the ability of science to develop these kinds of knowledge, in fact, 
which makes it necessary, as ‘without the contradiction between appearance and reality, 
science would be redundant, and we could [simply] go by appearances’ (ibid, 47).  
As this does not actually appear to be the case, however, it seems clear that 
philosophers must give up on the idea that Humean empiricism – along with its rejections of 
metaphysics and natural necessity - can provide us with an epistemological framework 
which is suitable for engaging in scientific forms of investigation. Indeed, more specifically, 
Bhaskar’s analysis illustrates that Humean empiricism is suspect because it claims that what 
exists, or what can be legitimately spoken of/known, is exhausted by what human beings are 
capable of experiencing by means of our sensory organs. This is problematic because it 
means that positivism – despite its attempted monopolization of the term ‘science’ – cannot 
in fact sustain the intelligibility of key activities such as experimentation. In fact, the 
Humean form of empiricism that has helped to ground this tradition forces us into a position 
in which we must choose between the adoption of either a philosophical approach ‘which is 
consistent with its epistemology but of no use to science’ or a philosophical approach 
‘which is relevant to science but more or less inconsistent with its epistemology’ (Bhaskar 
1989, 57).12 More generally, however, by reducing questions about what is (ontology) to 
questions about how we know what is (epistemology) positivism succumbs to the ‘epistemic 
fallacy’. This fallacy consists of ‘the analysis or definition of statements about being in 
terms of statements about our knowledge (of being)’ (2008 [1993], 373) and, in the case of 
Humean empiricism, results in the generation of an implicit (empirical realist) ontology 
which is tied to sensory experience. Critical realism, instead, has sought to avoid the 
anthropocentric idea that ‘[w]hat can be considered real always bears the mark, or insignia, 
of some human attribute’ (Patomäki and Wight 2000, 217). Rather than adopting the 
empiricist criterion for reality it has therefore explicitly rejected attempts to relegate the 
metaphysical to a lower status. In its place, it has argued in favour of a causal criterion for 
reality. If something is able to effect change in the world, after all, it can be legitimately said 
to exist, whether or not our sensory organs allow us to directly experience it.  
Such arguments may be refined, however, by returning to Bhaskar’s analysis of 
experimentation a second time. This is the case because his analysis allows us to replace the 
implicit (empirical realist) ontology which results from Humean empiricism with an explicit 
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alternative. An alternative, that is, which illustrates that the world is characterized by 
‘ontological depth’. The first thing to note in this regard is the fact that the persistent need to 
employ various types of measuring equipment illustrates that those events which occur are 
not necessarily accessible by means of our sensory organs. At the level of ontology it is 
therefore of key importance that we distinguish between the empirical realm (which 
concerns sensory experience, the exclusive focus of positivism) and the realm of the actual 
(which concerns the broader category of events as such). In addition to this, however, the 
nature of experimentation also suggests that our interventions can trigger (stimulate, release, 
enable, etc.) causal mechanisms which are both distinct/isolatable (Collier 1994, 46) and 
would have otherwise remained dormant. This is, again, of significant importance for the 
ontological stance we adopt, as such mechanisms may therefore be said to be real, 
irrespective of whether they are also activated (actual) or experienceable/experienced by 
means of our sensory organs (empirical). These conclusions are systematized in the model of 
ontological depth which is reproduced below, and are of course entirely at odds with 
Humean empiricism. Instead of the (implicit) ontology of empirical events in which this 
approach results, for instance, critical realist philosophy results in an (explicit) ontology of 
‘structurata’ (Wight 2006, 218). These structurata may be conceptualized, quite simply, as 
the various types of ‘stuff’ which exist – ranging from quarks to atoms, trees, dogs, people, 
and social systems – and as possessing various types of real causal powers; causal powers, 
that is, which, when they are triggered, produce actual and empirical events.  
 
FIGURE 1: ONTOLOGICAL DEPTH (Bhaskar 2008 [1975], 56) 
 
        
 
 
 
Rethinking and Reclaiming Causal Analysis 
 
It is not just at the level of abstract philosophical reasoning, however, that this ‘depth 
ontology’ is of significant importance. Rather, as this section will show, this ontology also 
allows us to both rethink and reclaim causal analysis in a way that breaks free from both the 
nomothetic and the idiographic approach to the study of civil war. In order to make sense of 
why this is the case it will, however, be necessary to return to Bhaskar’s analysis of 
experimentation a third time, as during this analysis he asks us to consider a key question: 
why is it the case that experimentation is required at all? He answers in the following 
manner: ‘an experiment is necessary precisely to the extent that the pattern of events 
forthcoming under experimental conditions would not be forthcoming without it’ (2008 
[1975], 33). If experimentation is in fact required in order to produce the regular sequences 
of events with which scientists are (most commonly) concerned, however, two key 
conclusions follow from this. First, it follows – against what has long been presumed to be 
the case by the proponents of (neo-) positivism – that even ‘hard science’ activities such as 
experimentation presuppose an account of its activities in which it is not in fact concerned 
with the discovery of universal laws or event regularities as such but, rather, in which it 
seeks to shield or isolate causal mechanisms from counteracting forces in order to produce 
patterns of events which would not otherwise be forthcoming.  
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In addition to this, however, it also entails that non-experimental settings are in fact 
unlikely to be characterized by the kinds of regularities which (neo-)positivists have long 
sought to discover. This is the case because mechanisms, when they are triggered in ‘open’ 
systemic settings, act in conjunction with other ‘stuff’. This stuff is likely to interfere with/ 
cancel out the operation of the mechanisms they encounter, and hence results in changes to 
the outcome that would have resulted in (experimentally) ‘closed’ systems. Such closed 
systems, importantly, require both intrinsic conditions (a stable structuratum/set of 
structurata with actualized causal powers) and extrinsic conditions (a context in which 
external factors are stable) for their realization, and it is only when these two conditions are 
met that empirical event (A) will always follow empirical event (B). If this is true, however, 
it means that there is in fact no need for causality to become manifest as regular sequences 
of empirical events at all. Rather, Bhaskar’s analysis illustrates that such sequences of 
events are not just insufficient for the establishment of causal relations – as neo-positivists 
have long acknowledged to be the case – but that they are in fact unnecessary as well.  
This has a wide range of philosophical/methodological implications, both at a 
general level and for the study of civil war. Among the most important of these, however, is 
the fact that it allows us to rethink the positivist (nomothetic) emphasis on prediction as a 
criterion for (1) demarcating ‘real’ science from non-science, and (2) measuring the maturity 
of a scientific discipline. This is the case, in short, because Bhaskar’s analysis illustrates that 
there is an unavoidable limit to making predictions in open systemic settings. A limit, that is, 
which results from a mechanism’s entirely contingent relations with other mechanisms 
throughout the wider (open-systemic) world. This invalidates the idea that it is an ability to 
predict which reflects the maturity of a discipline, whether conflict studies or any other, 
because even the most skilful of scientists may be able to retroactively explain the 
occurrence of events which take place in open systemic settings, but this does not mean that 
these events could also have been predicted by them. Rather, Bhaskar’s analysis of 
experimentation illustrates – in direct contradiction to what has historically been claimed by 
the proponents of positivism – that there exists a clear asymmetry between explanation and 
prediction, and that this asymmetry results from the ‘multiple determination’ of events in 
open systems (1989, 187). Indeed, as Steinmetz argues, his analysis shows that ‘in open 
systems, unlike the artificial closure characteristic of the experimental situation, mechanisms 
combine to produce actual events conjuncturally, that is to say, in concert with other 
mechanisms’ (1998, 177). More generally, however, Bhaskar’s analysis also illustrates that 
‘aside from our forensic or other practical concerns, there is nothing that is “the cause”, only 
causes’ (Collier 1994, 125), and that these include the ‘structural’, ‘root’, ‘proximate’, and 
other types of causes which conflict studies authors have long sought to uncover.  
If this is true, however, conflict studies authors would be wise to make a decisive 
shift away from the positivist assumption that it should develop a parsimonious (or even 
mono-causal) theory of civil war, and move towards explanations which engage with 
complex forms of co-determination (multi-causality). Moreover, Bhaskar’s analysis also 
illustrates that the conflict studies discipline requires a further shift away from the (overly-
ambitious) positivist criterion of predictive power to the (more realistic) criterion of 
explanatory power. While conditional (ceteris paribus) predictions of course remain a 
possibility, ‘and a powerful explanatory theory will be capable of situating ex ante 
possibilities long before they are realized’ (1989 [1979], 194), after all, his analysis 
illustrates that there is no philosophically-sound reason to assume that ‘real’ science should 
be able to provide accurate predictions. Indeed, even something as simple as the exact path 
which a falling autumn leaf will take is unpredictable in open systemic settings, as this path 
will be subject to various types of unpredictably interacting causal forces: from the 
gravitational to the aerodynamic, the thermal, and so on (Lawson 2008, 288-289).  
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In addition to allowing us to rethink nomothetic claims in these ways, however, 
Bhaskar’s analysis has a number of important implications for the proponents of the 
idiographic approach as well. First among these is the fact that it undermines the distinction 
which some anti-positivist approaches have sought to make between causal and non-causal 
approaches. This is the case, as Milja Kurki has shown, because both ‘self-avowed causal 
theorists […] and their critics have failed to recognize the role that a Humean background 
discourse of causation has had in shaping and delimiting the very starting points for the 
development of models and methods of causal analysis’ (2008, 7). What has at times been 
described as ‘non-causal’ by anti-positivists can, in other words, be reclaimed for causal 
analysis once we adopt a critical realist perspective, even if the phenomena we study 
(reasons for action, rules, etc.) do not in fact produce regular sequences of empirical events.  
Further to this, Bhaskar’s analysis has a second key implication for idiographic 
approaches as well. Specifically, it illustrates that there is in fact no need to draw on post-
structuralism or the new materialisms in order to make sense of either the non-repeating/ 
unique nature of human/social events or variations in both historical trajectories and forms 
of social organization. Indeed, doing so would be inadvisable, as the ontology which these 
approaches have adopted is likely to overstate the prevalence of flux. This is the case 
because limited examples of spatiotemporal closure (‘quasi-closures’) do in fact occur, even 
outside of experimental settings, and these result in what Tony Lawson has termed ‘demi-
regularities’ (1997, especially chapter 15). While such closures/regularities are of course 
‘always relative to a particular set of events and a particular region of space and period of 
time’ (Bhaskar 2008 [1975], 73) this does not mean that we should simply supplant the 
positivist ontology of unchanging covering laws with an ontology of unceasing change. 
Indeed, doing so would prevent us from making sense of powerful celestial regularities such 
as those that were described by Newton, and which characterize at least some (e.g. 
routinized) parts of the social world as well. What is required, instead, is an approach that is 
capable of accommodating both change (‘becoming’) and stability (‘being’), 
(Clausewitzian) chance and causal determination/natural necessity, in a coherent manner. 
This is, arguably, exactly what the critical realist theorization of open and closed systems, 
along with its mechanism-based approach to causality, provides us with. 
 
 
Beyond ‘Generalization Anxiety’ 
 
What, however, do these critiques of the nomothetic and the idiographic approaches mean for 
the (deductive and inductive) generalizing aims that are commonly associated with the notion 
of science? Before answering this question it is worth drawing attention to the fact that the 
critical realist critique of Humean empiricism that was discussed above suggests that the 
main mode of inference of the sciences is in fact neither deductive  nor inductive in nature. 
Rather, if the point of the sciences is to move (1) beyond (or even contradict) sensory 
experience, and (2) towards explanations which are in accordance with the model of 
ontological depth that was described above, this suggests that their predominant mode of 
inference should in fact be retroductive in nature. This means, in short, that their primary aim 
should not be to simply relate (certain types of) empirical events to other (types of) empirical 
events but, rather, that they should aim to work back from manifest phenomena (‘events, 
states of affairs, and the like’) to the mechanisms which produce these phenomena (a move 
which is represented in figure 2 below) (Bhaskar 1989, 181). Indeed, more generally, it 
means that engaging in causal forms of explanation involves working back from a 
phenomenon at one ontological level to its causes at a deeper ontological level. This goal is 
achieved by constructing (and testing) models of/narratives about mechanisms which, if they 
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were to ‘exist and act in the postulated way, would account for the phenomenon [with which 
we are] concerned’ (Bhaskar 2009 [1986], 61). In accordance with the true aim of ‘hard 
science’ activities such as experimentation, therefore, this formulation makes mechanisms 
rather than covering laws or event regularities the locus of our explanations. In addition to 
this, it also illustrates that there exist a number of clear affinities between the critical realist 
approach and the philosophical/methodological perspective that was adopted by influential 
historical sociologists such as Charles Tilly (2010).13 
 
FIGURE 2: RETRODUCTIVE INFERENCE14 
 
 
 
 
Importantly, however, the critical realist emphasis on retroduction also means that this 
approach is in fact at odds with both the deductively-oriented neo-positivist approach to the 
study of civil war and the inductivist alternative to this approach which has been proposed by 
Ratsimbaharison (2011). This is not to say, however, that these modes of inference should 
somehow be eliminated from the conflict studies discipline. Rather, it means that they must 
be provided with a different meaning to the one which they have been given by other 
approaches to the philosophy of science. In order to understand what exactly this means, 
however, it will be necessary to return to the depth ontology which Bhaskar develops one 
final time. This ontology is of importance because it allows us to clarify that the inductive 
and deductive modes of inference which have been employed by conflict studies authors in 
the past must be severed from the empiricist and the closed-systems assumption to which they 
have traditionally been attached. These modes of inference take on a very different meaning, 
after all, when they are understood from the perspective of both the ‘structurata ontology’ and 
the ‘closed/open-systems’ logic which critical realism has developed.  
As was shown, this approach claims that (actual/empirical) events are produced by the 
(real) causal powers of varied types of ‘stuff’. It is the activation of these causal powers in 
open and (quasi-) closed systems, therefore, that the uses of the inductive and deductive 
modes of inference apply to as well. If a (set of) mechanism(s) is actualized, its operation is 
internally stable, and it is operating in a stable context, for instance, we may deduce from this 
that (actual/empirical) patterns of events will continue to take place. Moreover, if an 
actualized (set of) mechanism(s) is not only internally stable but is also clearly dominating of 
other actualized (sets of) mechanism(s) within the context with which we are concerned we 
may conditionally deduce/predict that observed patterns of (actual/empirical) events will 
continue to take place. To the extent that the same (set of) mechanism(s) is actualized in the 
same systemic circumstances we may furthermore use inductive logic to generalize about 
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(actual/empirical) events that will take place in other spatiotemporal settings. Where such 
(sets of) mechanisms operate in open systems, however, we can no longer reliably generalize 
at the level of (actual/empirical) events, as counteracting tendencies are likely to alter or 
(partially) block the operation of the (sets of) mechanism(s) with which we are concerned.15 
From a critical realist perspective we can, however, generalize (as well as theorize) about the 
ways in which structurata operate, as these structurata have causal powers that are universal 
in nature. While patterns of (actual/empirical) events – like the Angolan civil war – are 
therefore quite particular in nature it is by directing our attention towards the causal powers 
of (real) stuff that a conception of universality can quite easily be sustained as well (Bhaskar 
1989, 16). Indeed, as a result of drawing on critical realist philosophy we are now in a 
position to clarify that it is the particular combination of causal powers in open and quasi-
closed systemic settings, as opposed to their possession, in which contingency inheres.16  
This distinction between generalization at the level of structurata and the level of 
(actual/empirical) events is not, however, a distinction that has always clearly been made 
throughout the conflict studies literature. A clear example of the tensions that have at times 
resulted from this can be found in Stathis Kalyvas’s The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 
which explicitly adopts a ‘deductive strategy’ that is aimed at ‘producing hypotheses about 
empirical variation’ (2006. 9, also see 85). This formulation draws on a variety of familiar 
neo-positivist tropes, and therefore makes it seem like prediction and the verification/ 
falsification of various hypotheses about violent conflict are the aims of his book. Indeed, one 
plausible interpretation of its aims is in terms of a kind of ‘micro-nomotheticism’ which is 
geared towards the development of theories of irregular warfare and microfoundational 
violence. On the page that follows this reference to deductivism, however, Kalyvas claims 
that ‘contexts may differ, [but] mechanisms recur’ (ibid, 10). This is – at least from a critical 
realist perspective – correct, but what is obscured by his account is an appreciation of the fact 
that mechanism-based explanations (of which there are many both throughout this book and 
his work more generally) and ‘hard’ deductivist research are in fact at odds with one another. 
We may, for instance, be able to spell out part of the ‘deep structure’ (ibid, 9) of civil war, as 
Kalyvas aims to do. Even if we manage to do so, however, it is important to keep in mind that 
we will not be able to reliably predict developments at the level of (actual/empirical) events, 
as structurata generally operate in open and/or quasi-closed systems. They will, therefore, 
inevitably interact with the powers of other stuff, and these may modify and/or cancel out 
their operation. Even if we establish the operation of a universal (set of) mechanism(s), 
therefore, we must, of necessity, engage with the particular context in which it/they operate 
as well. Universalistic analyses – such as the ‘globalization’ framework which Mary Kaldor 
(2001) sought to advance after the Cold War – are for such reasons unlikely to be fruitful.17 A 
similar conclusion applies, however, to idiographic analyses of civil war which have stressed 
particularity at the expense of universality. Just because we cannot reliably generalize at the 
level of (actual/empirical) events, after all, it does not follow from this that we cannot 
generalize at all, or that we do not already generalize anyway. Mechanisms, as Kalyvas 
points out, do indeed tend to recur, and – although their operation in concrete spatiotemporal 
settings has contingent results at the level of (actual/empirical) events – this does not mean 
that all forms of universality can (or have been) be eliminated from our analyses of civil war. 
Both nomothetic and idiographic research strategies, at least as they have been 
conventionally understood, are therefore problematic from a critical realist perspective. The 
first is problematic because it misguidedly attempts to secure the generalizing aims of science 
at the level of (actual/empirical) events, while such events are actually the more-or-less 
unique manifestations of ‘[s]hifting constellations of causal mechanisms’ (Steinmetz 2004, 
383). Idiographic forms of research are problematic, however, because they have mistakenly 
taken the non-repeatability/uniqueness of (actual/empirical) events to mean that the 
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generalizing aims of (especially) the human/social sciences are illusory, while we can (and 
do) in fact generalize at the level of structurata/mechanisms. While (actual/empirical) events 
such as the Angolan civil war are therefore certainly perfectly unique, it does not follow from 
this that the mechanisms which caused this war to occur (or endure, develop, terminate, recur, 
etc.) were also unique. The depth ontology that critical realism has developed prevents us 
from conflating these different ontological levels and forms of explanation, and thereby paves 
the way for a new approach to the study of civil war. This approach, instead of fetishizing 
either the universal at the expense of the particular, or vice versa, directs our social scientific 
attention towards providing explanations of the concrete, which may be understood as 
resulting from the complex (conjunctural/multi-causal) ways in which the universal powers 
of (real) stuff combine, very largely in open and/or quasi-closed systems, to form the 
particular events (actual and/or empirical) that take place.   
It should be noted, however, that critical realism allows us to problematize an 
additional assumption that has been prevalent throughout the conflict studies literature as 
well. This is the assumption that, in order to come to terms with the phenomenon of civil war, 
it is necessary to for us to uncover those factors with which it is regularly conjoined. Such 
ideas have of course had an impact on large-N/cross-national neo-positivist studies in 
particular, and can be helpfully disaggregated into two related problems. These will be 
referred to as the ‘uniformity fallacy’ and ‘regularity determinism’ in the next two sections.  
 
 
Beyond the ‘Uniformity Fallacy’ 
 
The first of these problems results from the fact that, against what Collier simply assumed in 
the sections that were quoted above, there may very well not be such a thing as ‘civil war as a 
phenomenon’ (2010, 125). That is to say, civil war may not be a phenomenon at all, but may 
be more adequately understood as a plurality of phenomena. Although, of course, the civil 
wars which conflict studies authors research may indeed turn out to have a variety of 
characteristics in common, it deserves emphasis that it is only substantive investigations 
which can in fact reveal whether or not this is the case. There are, in other words, no good 
philosophical/methodological reasons to simply assume that these authors should aim to 
uncover the causal pathways which result in a single phenomenon. This critique applies, 
importantly, to the more disaggregated studies that were discussed above as well. After all, 
even these disaggregated studies must demonstrate, rather than simply assume, that the 
implied unit homogeneity of for instance ‘identity conflicts’ is intellectually justified. 
Without engaging in substantive investigations, however, the adoption of a more 
disaggregated approach involves significant risks relating to unwarranted forms of 
generalization as well.18 Indeed, these kinds of studies fare only marginally better than the 
large-N/cross-national studies which they have sought to supersede and/or correct.  
Instead, conflict studies authors should draw on the philosophical framework which 
this article has developed in order to create the intellectual space that is required in order to 
dissociate their discipline from unjustified presumptions of uniformity. Indeed, avoiding the 
‘uniformity fallacy’ would not just prevent conflict studies authors from succumbing to 
unwarranted presumptions of unit homogeneity among (particular types of) civil wars but, 
importantly, would also open up to substantive investigations the question of whether any 
example of civil war should itself be plurally-understood. Once we abandon traditional (but 
misleading) assumptions about the meaning of terms such as ‘science’, after all, there does 
not appear to be any reason left for us to simply take for granted the idea that concrete 
examples of civil war should in fact be understood as amounting to one single event, whether 
diachronically/synchronically or across spatial contexts/within a single spatial context.19          
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Steering clear of the uniformity fallacy would, however, allow conflict studies authors 
to better address another set of debates that have divided this discipline as well. These 
debates are concerned with the question of whether civil war in the post-Cold War era should 
be understood as Clausewitzian (political) or post-Clausewitzian (economic or cultural), 
functional (as a system) or dysfunctional (as the breakdown of a system), without limit (total/ 
concentrated) or without end (dispersed), rational or affective, New or Old, organized or 
anarchic, etc. Like the aforementioned large-N/cross-national literature, however, these kinds 
of debates have too often been predicated on the idea that civil war can be one thing only. 
This is simply not the case. While (1) it seems likely that trends are indeed apparent within 
different historical periods and geographical areas, (2) there are undoubtedly ‘family 
resemblances’20 to be found among the various historical and contemporary examples of civil 
war, and (3) particularly powerful (sets of) mechanisms may indeed result in important 
(though non-invariant) regularities, this does not entail that the conflict studies discipline as a 
whole is engaged in the study of a phenomenon which is entirely uniform in terms of its 
origins, nature, etc. Rather than changing its ‘war story’ from one which has now become 
defunct to one which is supposedly more adequate, therefore, it is essential that conflict 
studies authors begin to more systematically pluralize the stories they tell. 
 
 
Beyond ‘Regularity Determinism’ 
 
It deserves emphasis, however, that even if the conflict studies discipline was in fact 
concerned with the explanation of an entirely uniform phenomenon (i.e. if ‘unit homogeneity’ 
could be demonstrated) there would still be no reason to assume that the causal pathways 
which result in its occurrence are the same, or even similar, in all cases.21 Just because I get 
on the bus every time I travel somewhere in London, after all, it does not follow that this 
empirical event is also brought about by the same, or even similar, causal mechanisms in 
each case. This assumption remains, however, a prominent feature of both large-N/cross-
national studies and the more disaggregated and geographically-/temporally-restricted studies 
of civil war that were discussed above, as authors who have pursued these forms of research 
have their philosophical/methodological roots in nomothetically-oriented forms of neo-
positivism. This has, as we have seen, resulted in attempts to uncover robust correlations 
between a large number of variables and the initiation/continuation/etc. of civil war in a wide 
variety of very different spatiotemporal settings. Precluded from consideration in the 
adoption of such a philosophical/methodological strategy, however, is the fact that any 
particular causal factor may indeed be extremely important when it comes to the explanation 
of one instance of (a particular type of) civil war, but irrelevant when it comes to the 
explanation of another. The results that both large-N/cross-national and more disaggregated 
and geographically-/temporally-restricted neo-positivist studies provide us with are, after all, 
representative only of the mean effect that a particular causal factor has had in all of the 
times/places that were considered. This, inevitably, does not tell us very much about the 
causes of any specific situation. Indeed, these mean values (1) continue to be insufficiently 
attentive to historical and geographical context, and (2) are likely to be, and have in fact 
already shown themselves to be, incredibly poor guides to understanding any concrete civil 
war. This results from the fact that neo-positivist studies, by relying on such mean values, 
succumb to what Bhaskar (2008 [1975], 60) has termed ‘regularity determinism’, a term 
which describes the assumption that the same (type of) event always has the same (type of) 
cause. As this assumption is not in fact philosophically/methodologically warranted, 
however, the nomothetically-oriented approach to conflict studies deserves to be treated with 
the utmost scepticism, despite its (entirely undeserved) monopolization of the term ‘science’.  
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Beyond Reformism 
 
More generally, however, it deserves emphasis that the arguments which the previous two 
sections have developed suggest that reformist responses to neo-positivist problems – such as 
those which focus on disaggregating the category of civil war, resolving data/technical 
problems, or restricting the time period/geographical range - simply will not allow us to 
overcome the obstacles that result from this approach. Instead, more radical responses to 
(neo-)positivist problems are required if the conflict studies discipline is to begin alleviating 
the crisis that was alluded to at the start of this article. Such radical responses should, in 
particular, make use of the ways in which critical realism allows us to both rethink and 
reclaim causal analysis (along with metaphysics and the ‘externality’ of natural necessity) in 
order to begin the more comprehensive task of rethinking and reclaiming science as such. 
Importantly, this would involve overturning the neo-positivist tendency to reduce history and 
geography to a ‘context-less data set or passive record through which abstract formulas, 
concepts and hypotheses can be assessed’ (Lawson 2010, 210). Indeed, it would involve 
putting to an end the merger between science and a-historicism/a-geographicism which has 
been effected by (neo-)positivism, and replacing this framework with an approach to 
scientific enquiry which is inherently contextual in nature.  
The critical realist approach arguably paves the way for exactly this kind of 
framework. In particular, it paves the way for a contextual approach to social science by (1) 
shifting our focus away from the type of universalism which characterizes nomothetically-
oriented approaches, (2) shifting our focus away from the type of particularism which 
characterizes idiographically-oriented approaches, and (3) shifting our focus towards 
systematic engagements with the concrete (historical/geographical) settings in which civil 
wars take place. This – along with its broader theorization of causality – has a number of 
distinct analytical advantages. First, it allows us to reclaim diversity – both in terms of the 
causal pathways that result in civil war and in terms of the diverse nature of these wars 
themselves – for social science by moving past ‘regularity determinism’ and the ‘uniformity 
fallacy’. Indeed, critical realism illustrates that, if it is to be effective at all, social science 
must systematically engage with, rather than just abstract from, diversity. Second, its focus 
on the concrete has the advantage of allowing us to both historicize/spatialize and generalize 
at the same time. This is the case because the ‘depth ontology’ which critical realism has 
developed clarifies that generalization occurs at the level of structurata/mechanisms, while 
historicization/spatialization takes place at the level of (actual/empirical) events. This matters 
because it overcomes the oft-encountered split between historical/geographical and scientific 
disciplines, and – importantly – re-integrates these disciplines into a contextual approach to 
social science which embraces the role of both historical/geographical narrative and causal 
explanation. Finally, the critical realist theorization of causality as a phenomenon which is 
characterized by a conjunctural logic has the advantage of allowing us to reject the neo-
positivist search for a parsimonious (or even mono-causal) theory of (certain types of) civil 
war in favour of an approach to social science which embraces the principles of multi-
causality/co-determination and complexity. Importantly, however, its adoption of these 
principles does not – as has commonly happened to idiographically-oriented studies of civil 
war in the past – result in the kind of ‘anti-parsimony’ or ‘absolute particularism’ to which 
various conflict studies authors have commonly objected. Rather, the critical realist insistence 
that causal mechanisms are likely to recur in different historical/geographical contexts means 
that – despite the uniqueness/non-repeating nature of (actual/empirical) events – civil wars 
can in fact be made intelligible by means of our social scientific investigations, especially 
when these investigations draw on our collective knowledge about the operation and effects 
of causal mechanisms in other civil war settings.  
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Conclusion 
 
On the whole it seems clear, therefore, that the mechanism-based understanding of causality 
which critical realism has developed is able to provide the conflict studies discipline with a 
significant number of the philosophical/methodological tools which it requires in order to 
begin to alleviate the crisis that was identified at the start of this article. As we have seen, 
this crisis has resulted from the fact that conflict studies authors have developed a variety of 
very different approaches which have consistently made competing/contradictory claims. 
The understanding of causality which critical realism has developed, however, allows us to 
better discriminate between the veracity of these claims, as it allows us to move past one 
particularly important source of these disagreements. In particular, this understanding allows 
us to move past the persistent split between nomothetically-oriented and idiographically-
oriented approaches to the study of civil war. As this split has continued to both divide the 
discipline and impede its development this is clearly of significant importance.  
With regard to its more specific contributions, however, this article has shown that 
drawing on critical realist philosophy would allow conflict studies authors to counter the 
influence of the ‘epistemic fallacy’, ‘regularity determinism’, and the ‘uniformity fallacy’. 
Indeed, at a more constructive level, it has illustrated that doing so would help these authors 
to (1) shift attention towards the use of retroductive logic, while severing the inductive and 
deductive modes of inference from the empiricist and closed-systems positions to which they 
have traditionally been attached, (2) shift attention away from the kinds of universalism and 
particularism that characterize nomothetically- and ideographically-oriented approaches 
towards a focus on concrete civil war settings, (3) shift attention away from mono-causal 
(and parsimonious) to multi-causal/conjunctural (and relatively complex) explanations of 
civil war, (4) shift attention away from predictive power to explanatory power, and (5) make 
mechanisms rather than covering laws or regularities the locus of both our  explanations of 
actual/empirical events (the realm of the applied sciences) and theorizations (the realm of 
the abstract/pure sciences). Importantly, however, this article has also shown that drawing on 
critical realist philosophy would allow the conflict studies discipline as a whole to do all of 
this without (1) rejecting, or restricting the range of, scientific forms of investigation, (2) 
rejecting, or restricting the range of, causal forms of explanation, and (3) nullifying our 
ability to engage in certain types of cross-context generalization (i.e. succumbing to 
‘generalization anxiety’). More generally, however, this article has shown that the 
mechanism-based understanding of causality which critical realism has developed would 
allow us to begin the important process of rethinking and reclaiming the notion of science by 
developing an approach to the study of civil war which is systematically contextual 
(historically-/geographically-sensitive) in nature. If this approach is in fact adopted by 
conflict studies authors this would – for a variety of reasons – have a transformational effect 
on the discipline. It would, for instance, drastically alter the discipline’s understanding of 
what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ research, it would undermine the power and prestige that is 
currently associated with various prominent journals, and it could even help to open up 
prevailing patterns of peer review, research funding, hiring, etc.  
Before we get ahead of ourselves, however, three issues are worth keeping firmly in 
mind. First, it should be noted that a critical realist-based approach to the study of civil war 
would not have to start its investigations from scratch. There remains, after all, much that is 
of use within especially the existing idiographically-oriented literature, even if the 
philosophical/methodological positions which this part of the conflict studies literature have 
historically been rooted in are problematic. Second, it deserves emphasis that (1) the 
idiographic and nomothetic approaches which this article has sought to transcend are by no 
means the only post-Cold War approaches to conflict studies, and (2) mechanism-based 
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approaches, such as those by Kalyvas and Tilly that were alluded to above, already exist. 
These approaches, while they have been unable to provide the conflict studies discipline 
with a philosophical/methodological basis which is sufficiently rigorous in nature, can 
nonetheless provide a critical realist approach to the study of civil war with a significant 
amount of the empirical and/or theoretical resources which it requires. The adoption of a 
dismissive attitude towards the existing conflict studies literature is therefore by no means 
warranted if we also choose to endorse the mechanism-based understanding of causality 
which critical realist philosophy of science has developed.  
Finally, one additional issue should be kept in mind as well. This issue concerns the 
fact that none of the aforementioned claims about the superiority of a critical realist 
understanding of causality should be read as suggesting that the aforementioned lack of 
disciplinary consensus can simply by resolved by adopting this understanding. There are, 
after all, very good reasons to believe that philosophical/methodological forms of reasoning 
– no matter how sophisticated they may become – can never fully eliminate the existence of 
competing and contradictory theorizations/explanations. Indeed, there are very good reasons 
to believe that theory choice is likely to forever remain an extremely precarious process, 
even if we do subscribe to the critical realist approach to understanding causality. This 
approach could, in fact, be argued to add to earlier discussions about why theory choice is 
often such a problematic process, as the depth ontology which earlier sections have 
described has a number of important epistemological implications as well. For instance, as a 
result of this ontology critical realist philosophy has commonly sought to draw attention to 
the fact that those sciences in which experimentation is either impossible or rarely-useful are 
‘denied, in principle, decisive test situations for their theories’ (Bhaskar 1998 [1979], 50). 
This observation adds to existing discussions about the precarious nature of theory choice 
because it suggests that (1) the creation of an artificially-closed system which shields or 
isolates causal mechanisms from counteracting forces is very largely impossible for social 
scientists, especially those working on the tumultuous issue of civil war, and (2) the creation 
of such an artificial form of closure is of significant importance if we are to ensure that our 
tests provide us with decisive forms of verification and/or falsification for our theoretical 
claims. From a critical realist perspective it seems clear, therefore, that the ‘hard scientific’ 
aim of fully eliminating competing and contradictory theorizations/explanations from our 
accounts of civil war – that is, the creation of a consensus which is final, complete, and 
perfect – is extremely unlikely to be realized. Indeed, from this perspective, our accounts of 
civil war are likely to forever remain incomplete, partial, provisional, subject to refinement, 
and open to iterative improvements. A consistent commitment to both epistemic modesty 
and a significant degree of theoretical pluralism is therefore clearly warranted by the 
adoption of a critical realist philosophical/methodological perspective.   
While a lack of disciplinary consensus cannot simply be resolved by drawing on 
critical realism, however, this does not mean that it cannot be alleviated in this manner. 
Despite its rejection of foundationalism, after all, critical realism has maintained that science 
can in fact make progress, and that it is often possible to arbitrate between competing and 
contradictory claims. Knowledge can therefore be accumulated and is not – as some of the 
more radical proponents of post-modern theory have suggested – merely performed. While, 
as authors like Andrew Bennet have shown, there do not appear to exist any ‘simple or 
infallible standards for theory choice […] useful standards [do] exist for judging theoretical 
progress and assessing some interpretations and explanations to be superior to others’ (2013, 
470). In order to engage in such assessments conflict studies authors might, for instance, 
make use of a number of common criteria for the evaluation of different theoretical claims, 
ranging from logical coherence to empirical support, theoretical realism, and explanatory 
power. More important for the purposes of this article, however, is the fact that re-focusing 
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our efforts on concrete civil wars would make the alleviation of theoretical disputes much 
more feasible. As opposed to attempting to mitigate a persistent lack of consensus by 
seeking to explain either a completely or a partially de-historicized, de-spatialized, and 
uniform notion of civil war, after all, this would shift our attention towards the diverse and 
historically-/geographically-specific civil wars which social scientists actually encounter, 
and which their various victims are either forced to live through or die from. It is arguably 
only by re-focusing our efforts in this way that questions about the causes and nature of civil 
war can potentially be addressed, and that relatively robust forms of knowledge can 
potentially be developed. Indeed, while this is unlikely to be a linear, monistic, or 
straightforwardly-cumulative process, it is only by re-focusing in such a manner that (1) 
inferences to the best explanation (so-called ‘abductive inferences’) have the potential to 
succeed, and (2) the path towards an ‘intermediate’ (not too ‘hard’ and not too ‘soft’) social 
scientific approach to the study of civil war can be cleared. The dominant neo-positivist 
strategy of attempting to uncover a probabilistic/quasi-nomothetic/quasi-deductivist/quasi-
falsificationist and parsimonious theory of (particular types of) civil war which subsumes 
every instance of this phenomenon under a covering law, however, is ill-fated. 
 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 Bhaskar’s later work has become increasingly controversial, even (or especially) among critical realists. The 
version of critical realism which I employ throughout this article, however, is perhaps best described as ‘basic’ 
critical realism. That is to say, I employ the positions that were developed in Bhaskar’s earlier work – and which 
were enriched/corrected by various other authors - without drawing on his later dialectical or spiritual writings. 
As of yet, I remain unconvinced of the position that Bhaskar has adopted in these writings. 
2 Throughout this article I will employ the term (neo-)positivism in an essentially heuristic or ideal-typical 
manner. That is to say, I use this term as a practical shorthand for a number of related propositions about the 
nature of science and causal explanation, all of which continue to exert a significant amount of influence 
throughout especially the human/social sciences. It deserves emphasis, however, that, at an historical level, this 
inevitably has the effect of obscuring the existence of a significant degree of diversity and disagreement among 
those authors who developed what are now commonly held to be the key tenets of (neo-)positivism. For 
instance, while contemporary (neo-)positivists generally incorporate at least some of the tenets of 
falsificationism into their work, this approach in fact has its historical roots in the ‘critical rationalism’ that was 
pioneered by Karl Popper, a critic of empiricism and ‘logical positivism’. The historical reality of (neo-) 
positivism is therefore significantly more ‘messy’ than will be made apparent throughout this article.   
3 This approach is referred to by a number of analogous terms as well. The most prominent among these are the 
deductive-nomological (or D-N) model of explanation and the Popper-Hempel model of explanation. A related 
notion is the idea of Humean constant conjunctions of events. 
4 These causal mechanisms range widely from greed and grievance to broader types of motives, preferences, 
opportunities, values, etc. 
5 Neo-positivist studies of civil war have faced persistent problems with (1) distinguishing between causal and 
non-causal (spurious) regularities, (2) establishing when hypothesized causes and effects are reversed, (3) 
engaging with interaction effects, and (4) establishing the equivalence and/or adequacy of proxies. For further 
discussions of these kinds of problems see for instance Cramer (2002, 2006) and Blattman and Miguel (2010). 
6 On historians and their relationship with inductive/deductive generalization see Lawson (2010, especially 210) 
7 Though it deserves emphasis that especially new materialist approaches have not applied these kinds of 
arguments exclusively to the human/social realm. 
8 For instance, as Mark Bevir and Jason Blakely (2015: 41) have shown, interpretive/hermeneutic approaches – 
though commonly associated with small-scale research – do not in fact need to be tied to this scale.    
9 Importantly, many of the early proponents of interpretive/hermeneutic work did not in fact reject causal 
analysis as such. On the causal thought of Max Weber, for instance, see Ringer (2002).  
10 Or, using Clifford Geertz’s well-known term, it must be ‘thickly described’ (1973, see especially chapter 1).  
11 We can think of these claims as the philosophical/scientific equivalent of common-sense statements such as 
‘there is more than meets the eye’ (trans-phenomenality) and ‘appearances can be deceiving’ (counter-
phenomenality).  
21 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
12 Indeed, as Collier comments, ‘[w]e could imagine a possible world in which everything there was to be 
known could be discovered in this way. But if, in our world, we restricted ourselves to such sources of 
knowledge, we would never have got out of the Middle Ages’ (1994, 32). 
13 On critical realism and historical sociology more generally see especially Steinmetz 1998 
14 This figure is a simplified version of the figure which is provided by Danermark et al (2001, 77).  
15 As Bhaskar has argued, causal powers may ‘be possessed unexercised, exercised unrealized, and realized 
unperceived (or undetected)’ (2008 [1975], 175). This means, amongst other things, that a distinction must be 
made between the existence of causal powers and their effects. In addition to this, however, it also means that 
causal mechanisms may be said to operate transfactually; that is, ‘independently of any particular sequence or 
pattern of events’ (Bhaskar, 2008 [1975], 3).  
16 This is, importantly, a position which I intend to qualify somewhat in a future article, as I consider Bhaskar’s 
‘thin’ account of the role of meaning in sociocultural life to be in need of some ‘thickening’ if it is to adequately 
account for the constitutive (as opposed to the representational) function of semiotic practices. 
17 From the perspective of critical realist philosophy Mats Berdal was therefore correct when he claimed that the 
problem with analyses such as the one that is favoured by Kaldor lies in their totalising pretentions, and ‘the 
deeply distorting effect this invariably has on any effort to understand individual cases and specific mechanisms 
at work’ (2003, 480) 
18 This is especially problematic because neo-positivists – as a result of the naturalist approach that informs their 
work – neglect the fact that human behaviour is, at least at times, the manifestation of forms of meaning which 
are highly contextual in nature. The meaning of appeals to ‘ethnicity’ (whatever that means) in various civil war 
settings therefore cannot simply be taken for granted, but must be investigated. This is a point that I intend to 
develop in greater depth in the same article that I referred to (above) in endnote number 15.  
19 More radically still, the conflict studies discipline could take an additional step by more systematically 
reflecting – as authors like Florea (2012), Blattman and Miguel (2010), and Cramer (2006) have already urged it 
to do – on the distinction which has historically grounded their discipline; the distinction, that is, between civil 
war and other forms of war and violence.  
20 Hidemi Suganami (1996, 190-195) was, it seems, the first to apply this (Wittgensteinian) term to the study of 
war. My encounter with it, however, was in the work of Christopher Cramer (2006, 94, 136).    
21 A similar argument is made by Suganami, who writes that the ‘[o]rigins of wars are so diverse that […] there 
is no one item which can be considered as the underlying cause of all wars’ (1996, 190).  
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